Detection & IR Lab¶
For Hiring Managers — Detection Engineer / SOC Analyst
What I Built: Functional SOC lab with Security Onion SIEM, TheHive case management, and Cortex enrichment. Authored custom detection rules, tuned alert thresholds, and documented IR playbooks.
Detection Engineering Skills: - Custom Sigma rule authoring and tuning - False positive analysis and threshold optimization - Multi-stage alert correlation - Evidence enrichment pipelines (VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB) - Playbook-driven incident response
Why This Matters: If I can build detection content and tune alerts in my own lab, I can contribute to your SOC/SIEM platform from day one.
Lab Metrics¶
12 custom detections Sigma-style rules for DNS, HTTP, authentication, and lateral movement patterns
~20% FP reduction Achieved through threshold tuning and allowlist refinement over 3-month lab period
8 IR playbooks Documented runbooks for common scenarios (malware, phishing, lateral movement, exfil)
15+ enrichment sources VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB, Shodan, GreyNoise, MISP feeds integrated via Cortex
Lab Architecture¶
flowchart TB
subgraph TARGETS["TARGET ENVIRONMENT"]
direction LR
WIN["Windows 10/11 Endpoints"]
AD["Windows Server Active Directory"]
LNX["Ubuntu/Docker Services"]
WEB["DVWA/bWAPP Vulnerable Apps"]
end
subgraph DETECTION["DETECTION LAYER"]
direction TB
SO["Security Onion IDS/SIEM"]
WAZ["Wazuh Host-Based"]
NES["Nessus Vuln Scanning"]
end
subgraph IR["IR LAYER"]
direction TB
HIVE["TheHive Case Management"]
CTX["Cortex Enrichment"]
MISP["MISP Feeds Threat Intel"]
end
subgraph OUTPUT["OUTPUTS"]
direction LR
CASE["Case Reports"]
PLAY["IR Playbooks"]
METRICS["Detection Metrics"]
end
WIN --> SO
AD --> SO
LNX --> SO
WEB --> SO
WIN --> WAZ
AD --> WAZ
LNX --> WAZ
WIN --> NES
AD --> NES
LNX --> NES
WEB --> NES
SO --> HIVE
WAZ --> HIVE
CTX --> HIVE
MISP --> CTX
HIVE --> CASE
HIVE --> PLAY
HIVE --> METRICS
style TARGETS fill:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706,stroke-width:2px
style DETECTION fill:#dbeafe,stroke:#2563eb,stroke-width:2px
style IR fill:#dcfce7,stroke:#16a34a,stroke-width:2px
style OUTPUT fill:#f3e8ff,stroke:#9333ea,stroke-width:2px Tool Stack¶
| Component | Role | Version | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security Onion | Network IDS/SIEM | 2.4.x | Suricata alerts, Zeek logs, Elasticsearch backend |
| Wazuh | Host-based detection | 4.x | Endpoint logs, FIM, rootkit detection |
| TheHive | Case management | 5.x | Alert-to-case workflow, evidence tracking |
| Cortex | Enrichment engine | 3.x | Automated IOC analysis (15+ analyzers) |
| Nessus | Vulnerability scanning | Essentials | Scheduled scans, compliance checks |
| MISP | Threat intel feeds | Community | IOC feeds for correlation |
Detection Content Authored¶
Sigma-Style Rules (12 Total)¶
| Category | Rules | Detection Focus |
|---|---|---|
| DNS | 3 | Tunneling, DGA domains, suspicious TLD queries |
| HTTP | 3 | Beaconing patterns, C2 callbacks, suspicious user-agents |
| Authentication | 2 | Brute force, credential stuffing, anomalous login times |
| Lateral Movement | 2 | SMB enumeration, PsExec-like behavior, WMI abuse |
| Exfiltration | 2 | Large outbound transfers, encrypted channel anomalies |
Example Detection Rule¶
# DNS Tunneling Detection (Simplified)
title: DNS Query Entropy Anomaly
status: experimental
description: Detects high-entropy DNS queries indicative of DNS tunneling
logsource:
product: zeek
service: dns
detection:
selection:
query|re: '^[a-z0-9]{32,}\.' # Long random subdomain
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- CDN randomized hostnames (allowlisted)
- Cloud service auto-generated domains
level: medium
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.004
False Positive Reduction¶
| Detection | Initial FP Rate | After Tuning | Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| DNS tunneling | ~35% | ~12% | Allowlist CDN patterns, entropy threshold adjustment |
| HTTP beaconing | ~40% | ~18% | Time-window correlation, user-agent filtering |
| Auth anomalies | ~25% | ~8% | Baseline normal hours per user group |
| Lateral movement | ~30% | ~15% | Exclude admin workstations, service accounts |
Average reduction: ~20% across all detection categories through iterative tuning.
IR Playbooks Documented¶
| Playbook | Trigger | Key Steps |
|---|---|---|
| Malware Detected | AV/EDR alert or Sigma match | Isolate → Capture memory → Hash analysis → Lateral check → Remediate |
| Phishing Reported | User report or email filter | Header analysis → URL/attachment sandbox → Credential check → Block sender |
| Lateral Movement | SMB/WMI/PsExec detection | Source/dest pivot → Timeline → Credential exposure check → Contain |
| Data Exfiltration | Large outbound or encrypted tunnel | Traffic capture → Volume analysis → Sensitive data check → Block egress |
| Brute Force | Auth threshold exceeded | Source analysis → Account lockout → Geo/IP reputation → Password reset |
| Insider Threat | Policy violation or anomalous access | Scope access → Manager notification → Forensic hold → HR coordination |
| Ransomware | File encryption indicators | Network isolate → Backup status → Variant ID → Recovery plan |
| Unauthorized Access | After-hours or geo-impossible login | Session termination → MFA reset → Access review → Timeline analysis |
Lab Drill Example¶
Scenario: Malicious Document + C2 Callback¶
Attack chain simulated: 1. Phishing email with macro-enabled document delivered to Windows endpoint 2. Macro executes PowerShell payload (simulated with safe script) 3. Beacon to external C2 (controlled test server) 4. Attempted lateral movement to DC
Detection response: - Security Onion flagged DNS anomaly + HTTP beaconing pattern - Wazuh triggered on PowerShell execution with suspicious arguments - TheHive case created automatically via webhook integration - Cortex enriched C2 domain (test domain marked malicious in lab MISP)
Outcome: - Time to detect: 4 minutes (automated) - Time to triage: 12 minutes (manual analysis + enrichment) - Playbook followed: Malware Detected → Lateral Movement check - Documentation: Full case timeline with evidence artifacts
What This Demonstrates¶
Detection Engineering¶
- Custom Sigma rule development (12 rules across 5 categories)
- Threshold tuning and FP optimization
- Multi-source log correlation (network + host)
- MITRE ATT&CK mapping in detection content
Security Operations¶
- Alert-to-case workflow automation
- Evidence enrichment pipelines
- Playbook-driven incident response
- Metrics tracking for detection efficacy
Technical Implementation¶
- SIEM deployment and configuration
- EDR/HIDS integration
- Threat intel feed integration
- Case management workflow design
Planned Enhancements¶
| Enhancement | Status | Target |
|---|---|---|
| SOAR integration (n8n or Shuffle) | 🔄 Researching | Q1 2026 |
| Purple team automation (Caldera) | 🔄 Installed | Q1 2026 |
| Detection-as-code CI/CD pipeline | ⏳ Planned | Q2 2026 |
| Formal detection efficacy dashboard | ⏳ Planned | Q2 2026 |
Related Projects¶
- TraceLock™ — Multi-domain RF detection (detection engineering in wireless domain)
- Homelab Infrastructure — The lab environment where this runs
- GIAP™ — GRC automation (similar pipeline thinking applied to compliance)