Detection Engineering¶
For Hiring Managers — Detection Engineer / Security Operations
TL;DR: I author detection content, tune SIEM alerts, and build IR workflows. My homelab runs Security Onion + TheHive/Cortex with 12 custom Sigma-style rules across 5 categories. Achieved ~20% false positive reduction through iterative tuning.
What I bring:
- Custom detection rule development (Sigma, Suricata, Zeek)
- Alert tuning and threshold optimization
- Multi-source log correlation (network + host)
- MITRE ATT&CK mapping in detection content
- Evidence enrichment pipelines (VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB, GreyNoise)
- Playbook-driven incident response
Why this matters: I don't just consume detection content — I create it. If I can build and tune detections in my own lab, I can contribute to your SOC/SIEM platform from day one.
View Detection Lab Details | See Sigma Rules | GitHub Repo | Contact
Detection engineering capabilities¶
12 Custom Detections Sigma-style rules for DNS tunneling, HTTP beaconing, auth anomalies, lateral movement, and exfiltration
~20% FP Reduction Achieved through threshold tuning, allowlisting, and baseline analysis over 3-month lab period
8 IR Playbooks Documented runbooks for malware, phishing, lateral movement, exfil, brute force, ransomware
15+ Enrichment Sources VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB, Shodan, GreyNoise, MISP feeds integrated via Cortex
Authored detection rules¶
Sigma-style rules (12 total)¶
| Category | Rules | Detection Focus | MITRE ATT&CK |
|---|---|---|---|
| DNS | 3 | Tunneling, DGA domains, suspicious TLD queries | T1071.004 |
| HTTP | 3 | Beaconing patterns, C2 callbacks, suspicious user-agents | T1071.001 |
| Authentication | 2 | Brute force, credential stuffing, anomalous login times | T1110 |
| Lateral Movement | 2 | SMB enumeration, PsExec-like behavior, WMI abuse | T1021, T1047 |
| Exfiltration | 2 | Large outbound transfers, encrypted channel anomalies | T1048 |
Example: DNS tunneling detection¶
title: DNS Query Entropy Anomaly
status: experimental
description: Detects high-entropy DNS queries indicative of DNS tunneling
logsource:
product: zeek
service: dns
detection:
selection:
query|re: '^[a-z0-9]{32,}\.' # Long random subdomain pattern
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- CDN randomized hostnames (allowlisted)
- Cloud service auto-generated domains
level: medium
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.004
False positive optimization¶
| Detection | Initial FP Rate | After Tuning | Tuning Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| DNS tunneling | ~35% | ~12% | Allowlist CDN patterns, entropy threshold adjustment |
| HTTP beaconing | ~40% | ~18% | Time-window correlation, user-agent filtering |
| Auth anomalies | ~25% | ~8% | Baseline normal hours per user group |
| Lateral movement | ~30% | ~15% | Exclude admin workstations, service accounts |
Average reduction: ~20% across all detection categories through iterative tuning over 3-month lab period.
Detection lab¶
Architecture¶
%%{init: {"themeVariables": {"fontSize": "18px"}}}%%
flowchart TB
subgraph TARGETS["🎯 ATTACK TARGETS"]
direction LR
T1["Windows 11<br/>Endpoint"] ~~~ T2["Active Directory<br/>Domain"] ~~~ T3["Ubuntu/Docker<br/>Services"] ~~~ T4["Vulnerable Apps<br/>(DVWA, Juice Shop)"]
end
subgraph DETECTION["🔍 DETECTION LAYER"]
direction LR
D1["Security Onion<br/>SIEM/IDS"] ~~~ D2["Wazuh<br/>Host-Based"] ~~~ D3["Nessus<br/>Vuln Scanning"]
end
subgraph IR["🚨 INCIDENT RESPONSE"]
direction LR
I3["MISP<br/>Threat Intel"] --> I2["Cortex<br/>Enrichment"] --> I1["TheHive<br/>Case Mgmt"]
end
subgraph OUTPUT["📊 OUTPUTS"]
direction LR
O1["Cases &<br/>Evidence"] ~~~ O2["IR<br/>Playbooks"] ~~~ O3["Detection<br/>Metrics"]
end
TARGETS --> DETECTION
DETECTION --> IR
IR --> OUTPUT
style TARGETS fill:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706,stroke-width:2px
style DETECTION fill:#dbeafe,stroke:#2563eb,stroke-width:2px
style IR fill:#dcfce7,stroke:#16a34a,stroke-width:2px
style OUTPUT fill:#f3e8ff,stroke:#9333ea,stroke-width:2px Tool stack¶
| Component | Role | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Security Onion | Network IDS/SIEM | Suricata alerts, Zeek logs, Elasticsearch backend |
| Wazuh | Host-based detection | Endpoint logs, FIM, rootkit detection |
| TheHive | Case management | Alert-to-case workflow, evidence tracking |
| Cortex | Enrichment engine | Automated IOC analysis (15+ analyzers) |
| Nessus | Vulnerability scanning | Scheduled scans, compliance checks |
| MISP | Threat intel feeds | IOC feeds for correlation |
Incident response playbooks¶
| Playbook | Trigger | Key Steps |
|---|---|---|
| Malware Detected | AV/EDR alert or Sigma match | Isolate → Capture memory → Hash analysis → Lateral check → Remediate |
| Phishing Reported | User report or email filter | Header analysis → URL/attachment sandbox → Credential check → Block sender |
| Lateral Movement | SMB/WMI/PsExec detection | Source/dest pivot → Timeline → Credential exposure check → Contain |
| Data Exfiltration | Large outbound or encrypted tunnel | Traffic capture → Volume analysis → Sensitive data check → Block egress |
| Brute Force | Auth threshold exceeded | Source analysis → Account lockout → Geo/IP reputation → Password reset |
| Ransomware | File encryption indicators | Network isolate → Backup status → Variant ID → Recovery plan |
Lab drill: attack chain simulation¶
Scenario: Malicious document + C2 callback¶
Attack chain simulated:
- Phishing email with macro-enabled document delivered to Windows endpoint
- Macro executes PowerShell payload (simulated with safe script)
- Beacon to external C2 (controlled test server)
- Attempted lateral movement to DC
Detection response:
- Security Onion flagged DNS anomaly + HTTP beaconing pattern
- Wazuh triggered on PowerShell execution with suspicious arguments
- TheHive case created automatically via webhook integration
- Cortex enriched C2 domain (test domain marked malicious in lab MISP)
Results:
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Time to detect | 4 minutes (automated) |
| Time to triage | 12 minutes (manual analysis + enrichment) |
| Playbook followed | Malware Detected → Lateral Movement check |
| Documentation | Full case timeline with evidence artifacts |
RF/wireless detection engineering¶
Detection engineering extends beyond network/host telemetry. TraceLock™ applies the same principles to RF threat detection:
| Domain | Detections | Use Case |
|---|---|---|
| Wi-Fi | Rogue AP, deauth attacks, evil twin | Physical security perimeter |
| Bluetooth/BLE | Unauthorized trackers, device enumeration | Counter-surveillance |
| SDR | Anomalous RF activity, signal classification | Spectrum monitoring |
| GPS | Spoofing detection via multi-receiver correlation | Location integrity |
| ADS-B | Drone proximity, aircraft tracking | Airspace awareness |
Skills demonstrated¶
| Category | Skills |
|---|---|
| Detection Engineering | Sigma rule authoring, Suricata/Zeek tuning, log correlation, MITRE ATT&CK mapping |
| SIEM/SOAR | Security Onion deployment, alert pipeline design, webhook automation |
| Incident Response | TheHive case management, Cortex enrichment, playbook development |
| Threat Intelligence | MISP feeds, IOC correlation, enrichment pipelines |
| Lab Operations | Proxmox virtualization, AD domain, vulnerable app deployment |
Growth trajectory¶
| Enhancement | Status | Target |
|---|---|---|
| SOAR integration (n8n or Shuffle) | 🔄 Researching | Q1 2026 |
| Purple team automation (Caldera) | 🔄 Installed | Q1 2026 |
| Detection-as-code CI/CD pipeline | ⏳ Planned | Q2 2026 |
| Formal detection efficacy dashboard | ⏳ Planned | Q2 2026 |
| CySA+ certification | 📅 Scheduled | January 2026 |
Related projects¶
- detection-rules — All 12 Sigma rules with CI validation
- Detection & IR Lab — Full lab documentation with additional drill scenarios
- TraceLock™ — RF/wireless detection engineering across 6 domains
- GIAP™ — Automation platform demonstrating similar pipeline thinking applied to GRC
- Homelab Infrastructure — The lab environment where this runs
Want to discuss detection engineering?
I'm actively seeking Detection Engineer roles where I can contribute authored detection content, tune alert pipelines, and build IR workflows.